## NC

Text: Developing countries should establish common property regimes for resource management. I reserve the right to clarify.

## Environment NB

The supreme importance of biological diversity on human well-being has been much documented in the ecological literature. Among the various processes currently endangering this diversity, the ones most often studied are rapid population growth, increased industrial pollution, and changing patterns of resource use occasioned by rising incomes and urbanisation. The WIDER programme has identified and explained the importance of two further sources of degradation of biological diversity and the environmental resource base, being traceable in turn to (a) a country's macro-economic policy (e.g. overvalued exchange rates, implicit subsidies on deforestation, and export promotion of cattle products) and (b) shifts in property rights (e.g. a move from communal management of local environmental resources, such as grazing and forest lands, to privatisation or government expropriation). The WIDER programme has also tried to codify the way these two sets of sources act as trigger-mechanisms for environmental degradation. **A large number of case studies** have **show**n **that** local **c**ommon **p**roperty **r**esource**s are collectively managed by rural communities in a number of ways (e.g.** through **collective decisions, decisions** arrived at **by village elders,** the use of **social norms** and their concurrent social sanctions, and so on**).** **Common property resources not only offer insurance protection to the rural poor in times of stress, they also are a source of non-wage income to the otherwise assetless. The link between population increase, accentuation of rural poverty, and the erosion of common property resources has been a major theme of the WIDER programme. The studies' main policy implication is that governments should aim to protect and promote the communal nature of the property rights to local environmental resources. Privatisation of rural forest and grazing lands is usually a harbinger of additional misery to the assedess, and it often also endangers the resource base itself. Likewise, government usurpation of common property resources has in a large number of cases been itself a source of degradation.**

## Neolib NB

Common property regimes are distinct from the top-down resource management policy of the aff. CPRs solve extinction and challenge the neoliberal conception of the human subject. **Fletcher 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

While we can find few concrete answers to such questions in the political ecology critique of neoliberal conservation per se, as thus far this critique has been primarily focused on analyzing and elucidating the conservation practices it contests, we might turn for guidance to a related body of work devoted to the analysis of common property regimes (CPRs). In opposition to Hardin’s (1968) classic ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis, which asserts that common pool resources will be inevitably degraded if left to their own devices and thus require ‘either socialism or the privatism of free enterprise’ (1998: 682) to be sustainably managed, CPR research documents numerous situations in which individuals, under certain specified conditions, work collectively to manage common pool resources for the long-term benefit of the group (e.g., Feeny et al 1990; Ostrom et al 1999; Agrawal 2003; Neves-Graca 2004). One important component of the CPR perspective is an explicit call for greater **democracy and participation in resource governance** regimes, which **are often hampered by authoritarian** **top-down structures** (Ostrom et al 1999). Ostrom and colleagues contend, for instance, that achieving **sustainable resource management** on a global scale **“will require** forms of **communication**, information, **and trust** that are broad and **deep beyond precedent**, but not beyond possibility. **Protecting institutional diversity related to** how diverse peoples cope with **CPRs may be** as **important for our long-run survival** as the protection of biological diversity (1999: 282). Similarly, Neves-Graca asserts that, “if **state institutions** as well as nongovernmental organizations are truly **committed to** addressing dilemmas of common-access resources and **developing effective ecological policies**, they **must let go of** currently dominant **managerial perspectives**. That is, they must abandon the typical approach to environmental programs **that follow**s **a top-down linear cycle of assessment** of environmental problems, definition of solutions, creation of environmental programs**, implementation** of these programs**, and** a posteriori **follow-up** of responses by those who are the target of these policies (2004: 299, emphasis in original). At the heart of this call for deeper democracy in resource governance stands a fundamental debate concerning the nature of human motivation and behavior (Neves-Graca 2004). **Key to** Hardin’s thesis, as to **neolib**eral theory in general, **is the assumption**, noted earlier, **that humans function as rational actors concerned first** and foremost **with** pursuing **their** own **self-interest** relative to (and at the expense of) others, and thus must be compelled by external agents to act in accordance with the common good. Central to the CPR perspective, by contrast, is the contention that **c**ommon **p**roperty **r**egime**s’ frequent success reveals** the inaccuracy of this assumption, demonstrating **that humans are in fact capable**—again under certain conditions—**of** self-organizing to achieve (**relatively**) **harmonious cooperation in the absence of external authority**. As Ostrom and her colleagues write: **The prediction that resource users** are led **inevitably** to **destroy CPRs is** based on a model that assumes all individuals are selfish, norm-free, and maximizers of short-run results…However, predictions based on this model are **not supported in field research or** in **lab**oratory **experiments in which individuals face a** public good or **CPR problem and are able to communicate, sanction one another, or make new rules…Reciprocal cooperation can** be established, **sustain itself**, and even grow (1999: 281).

2 impacts.

a. Neoliberalism destroys creativity, rendering the system unsustainable.

**Connolly 13** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

The danger of “serfdom” today, you might say, is the emergence of a regime in which a few **corporate overlords monopolize creativity** to sustain a bankrupt way of life; in which military, prison, and security budgets are increased significantly to cling to American hegemony in a world unfavorable to it; in which the element of **creativity is squeezed out of work life** for many citizens; in which the ideology of **freedom is winnowed to** a set of **consumer choices between preset options**; and in which compensatory drives to extremism in secular dogmatism and religious faith intensify. Moderate **neolib**eralism **cannot sustain itself under these circumstances**. Its erstwhile **proponents are** today **pressed either to allow a new priority** to course through them **or** to **give themselves to** an **extremism** many have heretofore hesitated to accept. But is there not also a tension in the positive account pursued here? Yes. **If you embrace** both an ethos of **responsibility** encoded into multiple interacting practices **and the creative element** in freedom**, you have introduced** a **tension between** these two **values. Any theory that acknowledges only one value, as radical neoliberals** tend to **do** in one way and holists in another**, is not worth its salt.** The question is how to negotiate the tension. Perhaps **the best hope is to** keep one eye on each of these values. We **keep the door open to creativity** in the practices of art, citizen movements, entrepreneurial innovations, court interpretations, sports activity, scientific experiments, religious movements, consumption choices, state modes of regulation, and the like **as we also commit ourselves to debate the quality of these innovations situationally with one eye on their probable effects** up**on the** interim **future.** That is one reason the elements of **care for the world and reflexivity are** so **important to a culture that prizes** the element of **creativity**. There is no guarantee we will always get the balance right, particularly in a world that is periodically jolted by surprises. But at least we will have committed ourselves to pay due attention to the several elements in play, keeping in mind that both the element of creativity and participating with dignity in a larger system help to make life worth living.

Creativity is key to value to life. **Connolly 13** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

If **creativity finds expression in** the human estate, it will sometimes do so at surprising moments during a disruption in a practice, opening the door to a **scientific invention, a new concept,** a **political initiative,** a new **social movement,** an **artistic innovation, market spontaneity,** a **language change**, a cooking invention, teaching improvisation, a new type of film scene, a musical production, the use of new media, or the invention of a new product. And so on endlessly. Our **identification with life** – our tacit sense of belonging to a human predicament **worthy of embrace** – **is partly rooted in reflexive reconsideration of** established **desires and ends. But it is grounded too in** those **uncanny** experiences of **creativity by** means of **which something new enters the world**. This may be one of the reasons people cleave to the sweetness of life. **It ties the sweetness of life to a vitality of being**, even more than to a preordained end, purpose, or “fullness” with which it is officially invested. The intimate relation between freedom and creativity is why **freedom is never sufficiently grasped by** the idea of **a lack to be fulfilled,** successful action upon **preset desires, or the drive to render the implicit explicit**. The experience of uncertainty or incompleteness is sometimes an occasion of fecundity.

b. Neoliberalism precludes ethics by reducing decision-making to economic self-interest.

**Sachikonye 10**[[4]](#footnote-4)

In terms of individual citizens neo-liberal government promotes the notion of the responsible citizen. Thus, the ideal individual in neo-liberal society practises personal responsibility by making informed rational decisions. **Neo-lib**eral democracy therefore ―**aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality** is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts‖ (Lemke, 2001: 201). Neo-liberal governments together with corporations create conditions in which the responsible rational individual can become a successful entrepreneur or consumer. The success or failure of the individual **depends on** his or her **skill and work ethic.** Hence, life for an individual in neo-liberal society becomes one of personal responsibility to a greater extent. Giroux 53 argues that under neo-liberalism the state no longer assumes responsibility for social needs and rather focuses on initiating various ‗deregulations and privatizations‘, whilst relinquishing all social responsibility to the ‗market and private philanthropy‘ (2004). **The neo-liberal state has no** real **obligation to**wards its **citizens except to provide** the **necessary conditions for** entrepreneurship and **consumerism.** As a result, a kind of **Darwinist ‘survival of the fittest’** ethic **becomes apparent**; Giroux argues that: ―[s]ocial Darwinism has been resurrected from the ashes of the 19th century sweatshops and can now be seen in full bloom in most reality TV programs and **in** the **unfettered self-interests that now drives popular culture.** As narcissism is replaced by unadulterated materialism, public concerns collapse into utterly private considerations and where public space does exist it is mainly used as a confessional for private woes, a cut throat game of winner take all, or an advertisement for consumerism‖ (2004) 54 . This is a sentiment that is echoed by Bourdieu 55 , who states that **this** form of moral Darwinism **establishes** what he terms **the ‘cult of the winner’** and ultimately institutes a survival of the fittest mentality that is **underpinned by cynicism and self interest** (1998). The neo-liberal state utilises knowledge like market research as a technique of power. This is similar to how the government in the 17 th century viewed statistics as the ‗science of the state‘ and a component of the technology of government (Smart, 2002: 129). The neoliberal government can now use market research to indirectly control its citizens as well as gather information about their personal lives. Market research with its use of modern technology and accurate data supersedes census studies and statistics. Dufour writes: ―[v]ast numbers of market researchers are therefore always taking the pulse of consumers and surveying their sexual and emotional lives, so as to anticipate their needs and to give their desires possible names and credible destinations‖ (2008: 58). The collecting of such information and the use of it to control citizens fits the Foucauldian critique. The field of marketing is a highly efficient technology of neo-liberal governance; it becomes a mechanism through which neo-liberal government can regulate a consumer society and provide specific products to cater for the varied needs of different individuals. Dufour notes: ―[t]here is no such thing as a small profit. A profit can be made from babies who ‗want‘ their favourite shampoo, senior citizens who ‗want‘ to occupy their spare time and invest their savings, poor adolescents who ‗want‘ cheap brand names and rich adolescents who ‗want‘ their own cars. They must all be satisfied. ‗I‘ is now central to every advert‖ (2008: 58). Neo-liberalism dominates society through subtle means. Thus, neo-liberalism does not seek ‗to assert itself by placing disciplinary controls on life‘ (Dufour, 2008: 157). Neo-liberalism has permeated society by using subtle ‗political technologies‘. These mechanisms of power transcend the old overt ‗technologies‘: religion, the police and family, and are more flexible in that they are less reliant on coercion and are less costly, as noted by Dufour (2008: 157). The new political technologies of neo-liberal governance include: the internet, multimedia software, the fields of marketing and management, as well as telecommunications technology governance have yielded more control, management and surveillance than any traditional government could have hoped for. **Neo-lib**eral governance has also **managed to dehumanise** human society **by forcing the complexity of human difference into the narrow confines of** entrepreneurialism, **consumerism** and the logic of self interest. Fine and Leopold write: ―[a]re we the manipulated mannequins of the advertising industry, the sovereignless victims of profit-hungry corporate capital, rational economic man and women trading off one commodity against another according to their relative prices and utilities?‖ (1993: 3). This is indeed a grim question to fathom but one which neo-liberal governance has made pertinent.

Resisting neoliberalism requires critically analyzing the way the government constructs individuals as economic actors. **Hamann 09** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

This ”critical attitude” that Foucault repeatedly refers to in all of his discussions of Kant from the 1970’s and 1980’s is inseparable from both his analysis of governmentality and his discussions of ethics and the history of the experience of the relation-ship between the subject and truth. What fascinated Foucault about the ”care of the self” he discovered in Greek and Roman ethics was the ”spiritual” relationship that existed between the subject and truth. In order to gain access to the truth, that is, in order to acquire the ”right” to the truth, individuals had to take care of themselves by engaging in certain self-transformative practices or ascetic exercises. Here we find critical and resistant forms of subjectivation where, rather than objectifying them-selves within a given discourse of power/knowledge, individuals engaged in prac-tices of freedom that allowed them to engage in ethical parrhesia or speak truth to power. In modernity, however, following what Foucault identified as ”the Cartesian moment” the principle ”take care of yourself” has been replaced by the imperative to “know yourself” [THS, 1 - 24]. In contemporary life that which gives an individual access to the truth is knowledge and knowledge alone, including knowledge of one’s self. In this context knowledge of the self is not something produced through the work individuals perform on themselves, rather it is something given through dis-iplines such as biology, medicine, and the social sciences. These modern forms of knowledge, of course, become crucial to the emerging biopolitical forms of govern-mentality. Whereas individuals were once urged to take care of themselves by using self-reflexive ethical techniques to give form to their freedom, modern **biopolitics ensures that individuals are** already **taken care of in terms of** biological and **economic forms of knowledge** and practices. As Edward F. McGushin puts it in his book Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, Power functions by investing, defining, and caring for the body understood as a bioeconomic entity. **The operation of biopower is to define** the freedom and truth of **the individual in economic** and biological **terms**. Reason is given the task of comprehending the body in these terms and setting the conditions within which it can be free. ...The formation of the disciplines marks the moment where askesis itself was absorbed within biopolitics. Foucault explicitly identified critique, not as a transcendental form of judgment that would subsume particulars under a general rule, but as a specifically modern ”attitude” that can be traced historically as the constant companion of pastoral power and governmentality. As Judith Butler points out in her article “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”,39 **critique** is an attitude, distinct from judgment, precisely because it **expresses a skeptical** or questioning **approach to the** rules and **rationalities** that serve as the basis for judgment **within a** particular **form of governance**. From its earliest formations, Foucault tells us, the art of government has al-ways relied upon certain relations to truth: truth as dogma, truth as an individualizing knowledge of individuals, and truth as a reflective technique comprising general rules, particular knowledge, precepts, methods of examination, confessions, inter-views, etc. And while **critique** has at times played a role within the art of government itself, as we’ve seen in the case of both liberalism and neoliberalism, it **has** also **made possible** what Foucault calls “the art of not being governed, or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (WC, 45). Critique is neither a form of abstract theoretical judgment nor a matter of outright rejection or condemnation of specific forms of governance. Rather it is a practical and agonistic engagement, re-engagement, or disengagement with the rationalities and practices that have led one to become a certain kind of subject. In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault suggests that **this** modern attitude is a voluntary choice made by certain people, a **way of acting** and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and **presents itself as a** task.40 Its task amounts to a **“historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves** and to recognize ourselves **as subjects** of what we are doing, thinking, [and] saying” (WE, 125). But how can we distinguish the kinds of resistance Foucault was interested in from the endless calls to ”do your own thing” or ”be all you can be” that stream forth in every direction from political campaigns to commercial advertising? How is it, to return to the last of the three concerns raised above, that Foucault does not simply lend technical sup-port to neoliberal forms of subjectivation? On the one hand, we can distinguish criti-cal acts of resistance and ethical self-fashioning from what Foucault called ”the Cali-fornian cult of the self” (OGE, 245), that is, the fascination with techniques designed to assist in discovering one’s ”true” or ”authentic” self, or the merely ”cosmetic” forms of rebellion served up for daily consumption and enjoyment. On the other hand we might also be careful not to dismiss forms of self-fashioning as ”merely” aesthetic. As Timothy O’Leary points out in his book Foucault and the Art of Ethics, Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence countered the modern conception of art as a singular realm that is necessarily autonomous from the social, political, and ethical realms, at least as it pertained to his question of why it is that a lamp or a house can be a work of art, but not a life. O’Leary writes: Foucault is less interested in the critical power of art, than in the ‘artistic’ or ‘plas-tic’ power of critique. For Foucault, not only do no special advantages accrue from the autonomy of the aesthetic, but this autonomy unnecessarily restricts our possibilities for self-constitution. Hence, not only is Foucault aware of the specific nature of aesthetics after Kant, he is obviously hostile to it.41 What O’Leary rightly identifies here is Foucault’s interest in an aesthetics of existence that specifically stands in a critical but immanent relation to the ways in which our individuality is given to us in advance through ordered practices and forms of knowledge that determine the truth about us. The issue is not a matter of how we might distinguish “authentic” forms of resistance (whatever that might mean) from “merely” aesthetic ones. Rather it is a matter of **investigating** whether or not **the practices we engage in** either reinforce or resist the manner in which our freedom—how we think, act, and speak—has been governed in ways that are limiting and intolerable. In short, critical resistance **offers possibilities for** an experience of **de-subjectification.** Specifically in relation **to neoliberal** forms of **governmentality, this would involve resisting,** avoiding, countering **or opposing not only the ways** in which **we’ve been encouraged to be** little more than **self-interested subjects** of rational choice (to the exclusion of other ways of being and often at the expense of those “irresponsible” others who have “chosen” not to amass adequate amounts of human capital), **but** also **the ways** in which our social environments, **institutions**, communities, work places, and forms of political engagement have been reshaped in order to **foster the production of Homo economicus**. Endless examples of this kind of work can be found in many locations, from the international anti-globalization movement to local community organizing.

## Extra Cards

Nepal proves. CPRs solve better than top-down government management.

**Ostrom et al 99** write[[6]](#footnote-6)

The **farmer-managed irrigation systems of Nepal are examples of well-managed CPRs** that rely on strong, locally crafted rules as well as evolved norms (27). Because the rules and norms that make an irrigation system operate well are not visible to external observers, **efforts** by well-meaning donors **to replace** primitive, **farmer-constructed systems with** newly constructed, **government-owned systems have reduced** rather than improved **performance** (28). **Government-owned systems are built with concrete and steel** headworks**, in contrast to** the **simple mud, stone, and trees used by the farmers** (Fig. 1). However, the cropping intensity achieved by farmer-managed systems is significantly higher than on government systems (Table 2). **In a regression model of system performance**, controlling for the size of the system, the slope of the terrain, variation in farmer income, and the presence of alternative sources of water, both **government ownership and** the presence of **modern headworks have a negative impact on water delivered** to the tail end of a system, hence a negative impact on overall system productivity (27).

## AT Specific Blueprint Key

The counter-plan is a defense of self-governance in resource management. The point is that what a CPR exactly looks like is contingent to particular communities.

**Regmi 4** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**There are those who believe that rational actors cannot extricate themselves from a “commons” dilemma and**, therefore, an external “Leviathan” is required to prevent a “tragedy of the commons”. Such a theoretical perception that governments are necessary to supply and organize collective action has resulted in actions such as the nationalization of forests and the concentration of power in government to supply irrigation water. Similarly, proponents of Privatization are also influenced by the same models and believe that the best way to avoid a “commons dilemma” is to impose a system of private property rights (Demestz 1967; Johnson 1972; Smith 1981). Again, this position is based on the premise that an absence of secure property rights results in high transaction costs, mal-distribution and over-exploitation of resources, and the presence of private property rights provide incentives to owners of resources to protect them (Acheson, 1989). A common theme that unites these two policy prescriptions is that **institutional change must** come from outside and must **be imposed on the actors. An alternate** competing **idea** that is emerging strongly **is** that of **self-governance**. Rejecting the assumption that external actors can easily design optimal institutional solutions and enforce rules at low costs, **it is argued that users of a “commons” are better equipped to resolve the cooperation problem as the solutions tend to be conditional and situation specific** (Ostrom, 1990). **The question “what could these conditions be” has driven** a **voluminous** amount of **research** work **and** the **results** emerging **from this work indicate that self-governance** in many instances **can** indeed **be a viable policy alternative.**

1. Robert Fletcher (Department of Environment, Peace and Security, University for Peace, Costa Rica). “Neoliberal Environmentality: Towards a Poststructuralist Political Ecology of the Conservation Debate.” 2010. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/8301/Neoliberal%20Environmentality-Fletcher.pdf?sequence=1 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. William Connolly (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University). The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Duke University Press. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. William Connolly (Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University). The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Duke University Press. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Tawanda Sachakonye (Rhodes University). “A Foucauldian Critique of Neo-liberalism.” January 2010. http://eprints.ru.ac.za/1812/3/Sachikonye-MA-TR10-48.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Trent H. Hamann is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at St. John's University. “Neoliberalism, governmentality, and ethics,” Foucault Studies, No 6, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Elinor Ostrom (Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University), Joanna Burger (Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Institute, Rutgers University), Christopher Field (Carnegie Institution of Washington, Stanford, CA), Richard Norgaard (Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley), David Policansky (National Research Council, Washington, DC). “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science’s Compass. 1999. http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic209735.files/Revisiting\_the\_Commons.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ashok Regmi. “Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal.” Presented at a colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, on Monday, February 23, 2004. http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/colloquia/materials/papers/regmi\_paper.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-7)